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Harvard University
This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping-
generations economy. It compares the allocation of risk the economy
reaches naturally to the allocation that would be reached if genera-
tions behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” could share risk with one
another through complete Arrow-Debreu contingent-claims markets.
The paper then examines how the government might implement op-
timal intergenerational risk sharing with a social security system. One
conclusion is that the system must either hold equity claims to capital
or negatively index beneﬁts to equity returns.
I. Introduction
Do market economies allocate risk efﬁciently? If not, what government
policies can improve the allocation of risk? These are classic questions
of economic theory. One celebrated answer comes from the Arrow-
Debreu theory of general equilibrium. This theory teaches that under
certain conditions—in particular, if contingent-claims markets are com-
plete—the allocation of risk will be Pareto efﬁcient. In other words,
with complete markets, society can let the invisible hand allocate risk.
This paper is a revision of NBER Working Paper 8270. We are grateful for suggestions
from Christopher Carroll, David Romer, Stephen Zeldes, the referee, and the editor.524 journal of political economy
This paper explores a deviation from Arrow-Debreu theory that arises
from the fact that not everyone is born at the beginning of time. In an
overlapping-generations economy, markets must be incomplete, because
a person cannot engage in risk-sharing trades with those who are not
yet born. The risks associated with holding capital assets, for instance,
can be shared with others alive at the same time, but they cannot be
shared with future generations. As a result, the allocation of risk need
not be efﬁcient, and government policy may be able to make Pareto
improvements.
The suboptimality of risk allocation in stochastic overlapping-gener-
ations models has been discussed in several recent papers, including
Bohn (1998), Shiller (1999), Rangel and Zeckhauser (2001), and Smet-
ters (2002). We approach this issue by considering a simple thought
experiment. Imagine that all generations ever to be born were here
today and able to trade in complete contingent-claims markets. How
would the allocation of risk in this complete-markets setting differ from
the one the economy reaches without these prenatal risk-sharing trades?
1
This approach builds on two traditions. The ﬁrst is the Arrow-Debreu
theory of general equilibrium. In essence, our thought experiment
opens up all markets that are assumed to exist in Arrow-Debreu theory
but, in fact, cannot exist in an overlapping-generations economy. The
second tradition is the Rawlsian approach to social justice. Our thought
experiment envisions a hypothetical time period in which all generations
are alive in an “original position” behind a “veil of ignorance.” In Rawls’s
(1971) work on social insurance, the ignorance concerns cross-sectional
uncertainty about one’s station in life. Here, the ignorance concerns
time-series uncertainty about whether one is born into a lucky or unlucky
generation.
This theoretical investigation is motivated by practical issues of public
policy. The government inﬂuences the allocation of risk among gen-
erations in many ways, most notably through the social security system.
A benevolent policy maker might try to use these instruments to achieve
the allocation of risk that the invisible hand would reach if it could.
That is, the policy maker might try to implement the outcome that
people would achieve on their own if, as in our thought experiment,
they were able to fully trade risks. Our goal, therefore, is not only to
examine how different the world would be with complete markets but
also to discuss how, without such markets, government policy might
substitute for them. This analysis sheds light, for instance, on how the
1 Bohn’s paper is perhaps the closest to this one. Bohn’s model is similar in spirit to
ours, and he shows how various ﬁscal policies shift risk between generations. However,
Bohn does not try to determine the optimal allocation of risk or the social security systems
that implement this allocation.intergenerational risk sharing 525
social security trust fund should be invested and how beneﬁts should
respond to macroeconomic shocks.
We proceed as follows. Section II presents a stochastic overlapping-
generations model that we use in our main analysis. To keep things
simple, we assume a single source of risk: uncertainty about the return
on capital. We begin by describing the equilibrium in which people can
trade only with others alive at the same time, so each generation bears
the entire risk realized during its lifetime. We call this the natural equi-
librium because it is the equilibrium that arises under realistic assump-
tions about trading possibilities.
In Section III, we introduce the central thought experiment of the
paper. Maintaining the overlapping-generations framework of Section
II, we posit the existence of complete contingent-claims markets—mar-
kets for the consumption good in each period in every possible history.
The individuals who will make up all generations participate in these
markets in an “original position” that exists before the beginning of
time. We call the allocation of consumption determined in the original
position the complete-markets equilibrium.
Sections IV and V solve for the complete-markets equilibrium in the
model. In general, one cannot obtain an analytic solution, so we simplify
the problem in alternative ways. In Section IV we consider a special case
in which only a single generation faces uncertainty in capital returns
and examine how this risk is shared with other generations. In Section
V we consider the more general case in which many generations face
uncertainty. We derive an approximate solution that is valid when the
shocks are small.
The solution we ﬁnd in Section V takes a simple and intuitive form.
We ﬁnd that capital-return risk in each period is shared equally among
the generations alive during that period and all subsequent generations.
In contrast to the natural equilibrium, where consumption is serially
uncorrelated from generation to generation, consumption in the
complete-markets equilibrium follows a random walk.
We next move closer to issues of policy. Because it is not yet feasible
to transport people back in time to an original position, free markets
are not a practical way to share intergenerational risks. In Section VI,
we ask whether government policies can substitute for the missing mar-
kets and ensure the complete-markets allocation. We ﬁnd a simple policy
that does so: a fully funded social security system in which the system’s
trust fund holds equity. In this system, beneﬁts are adjusted in response
to shocks to equity returns to keep the system solvent.
There is, however, more than one way for policy to achieve any given
allocation of risk. Policy makers can also implement the complete-
markets equilibrium if the social security trust fund holds safe debt. Yet526 journal of political economy
in this system, beneﬁts must be adjusted in what, at ﬁrst glance, may
seem a surprising way: they must be negatively indexed to equity returns.
Section VII considers some variations on our basic model, and Section
VIII presents conclusions.
II. The Model and the Natural Equilibrium
This section describes the basic version of our overlapping-generations
model, which we keep simple to build intuition. A ﬁxed number of
people are born each period, and everyone lives for two periods. When
young, a person receives an endowment of one unit of the consumption
good. Each person consumes only when he is old. Thus a person saves
his entire endowment, and it becomes next period’s capital stock. He
consumes the return on this saving, including the principal, when he
is old. There are no bequests. We assume log utility over consumption;
thus expected lifetime utility for an individual born in period t is
E[U] p E[ln(c )], (1) tt 1
where is the individual’s consumption in period , when he is ct  1 t1
old.
Our assumption that only the old consume simpliﬁes the model by
eliminating the intertemporal consumption decision of the young,
which is not essential to the issue of intergenerational risk sharing. In
Section VII, we discuss a more general model in which individuals con-
sume in both periods of life.
The economy contains many competitive ﬁrms. Firms have a linear
production function
Y p RK, (2) tt t
where Y is output and K is capital. Firms obtain capital from the old.
Capital depreciates 100 percent at the end of the period. These as-
sumptions imply that the gross return on savings at period is . t  1 Rt
The ﬁrms make zero proﬁts, so it does not matter who owns them.
We take the capital return to be an exogenous random variable. Rt
It is distributed independently over time and has a two-point distribu-
tion. Let m be the average value of the interest rate. The return equals Rt
with probability one-half and with probability one-half. The m  jm  j tt
term jt measures the degree of dispersion in the capital return in period
t. It is natural to focus on the case in which jt is time-invariant (and we
will do so below), but it will prove useful to have in hand the general
case in which jt varies across periods. We assume that the lowest possible
return, , is greater than one; this ensures that the model satisﬁes m  jt
Abel et al.’s (1989) condition for dynamic efﬁciency in Diamond’s
(1965) sense.intergenerational risk sharing 527
As a benchmark, we begin by considering the equilibrium of this
model without any intergenerational risk sharing. This equilibrium is
assumed in most previous work on stochastic overlapping-generations
models. It is based on the realistic assumption that people can trade
only with others who are alive at the same time. We also make the
standard assumption that the young enter the market after the current
return on savings is realized; thus there is no remaining uncertainty
within a period for the old and young to share. As noted above, we call
this outcome the natural equilibrium.
Given the environment just described, the natural equilibrium is triv-
ial to derive. The generation born at t saves its endowment and consumes
its wealth when old. Thus its consumption, , equals . Given the cR t1 t1
two possible realizations of , the generation’s expected utility is Rt1
.
1[ln(m  j ) ln(m  j )] t1 t1 2
Because is uncorrelated over time, each generation bears all of Rt1
a single idiosyncratic risk—the return risk in the period in which it
happens to be old. Note that consumption is independently distributed
from generation to generation.
This natural equilibrium is clearly inefﬁcient. There would be gains
if the old generation at period could share the risk it faces with t  1
the generations born at and later. However, by the time these t  1
generations are born and ready to participate in markets, the outcome
for period is already realized, and private improvements in risk t  1
allocation are no longer possible.
III. The Complete-Markets Equilibrium
We now consider a hypothetical world with markets for intergenerational
risk sharing. We assume that all generations are placed in an “original
position” that exists before period 0, when the ﬁrst generation is born.
In this original position, each person knows when he will be born, but
he does not know the future evolution of the economy; in particular,
he does not know whether his generation will be lucky or unlucky in
its realization of capital returns. In the original position, everyone can
share the risks they face by participating in contingent-claims markets.
We use the following terminology. We let vt denote the state of the
economy in period t. The state captures the period’s capital return: it
is “high” ( ) if and “low” ( ) if . We v p HR p m  jv p LR p m  j tt t t t t
let V denote the set of possible states: . A “history” of the V p {H, L}
economy through period t is a sequence of states for periods . 1, …, t
We denote a history by . There are 2
t possible histories
t v p (v ,… ,v) 1 t
of the economy through period t, each of which occurs with probability
.
1 t () 2
We assume that the markets in the original position are complete in528 journal of political economy
the sense that there is a market for the consumption good in each
period and each possible history through that period. For each period
t, there are 2
t markets for contingent consumption goods indexed by
v
t.
A person born in period t receives an endowment of one unit of the
consumption good in all histories of the economy through t. Thus his
endowment is one unit of good v
t for all possible v
t. The consumer sells
this endowment and uses the proceeds to buy conditional consumption
goods at , when he wants to consume. He maximizes his expected t  1
utility over all possible histories subject to his budget constraint. With
the price of the consumption good in period t and history v
t, the
t p(v)
individual’s problem is
1 t1 t max u(c (v ))[( ) ]  t1 2
t1 … v V## V
t1 t1 t subject to c (v )p(v ) p p(v),  t1
t1 t … … v V## Vv V## V
where . u(c ) p ln(c ) t1 t1
Firms also participate in the contingent-claims markets. A ﬁrm buys
contingent goods at t, uses them as capital at , and sells its output. t  1
If a ﬁrm purchases good v
t, it produces two contingent goods dated at
—one for each of the histories that is a continuation of v
t.W e t  1
denote these two histories by (v
t, ) for . With a unit of vv p H, L t1 t1
good v
t, the ﬁrm produces units of good (v
t, H) and m  jm  j t1 t1
units of good (v
t, L). It chooses its purchases of goods, , to maximize
t i(v)
proﬁts:
tt t t t maxi(v)p(v)  i(v)[(m  j )p(v, H)  (m  j )p(v, L)] t1 t1
t i(v )
t … Gv  V ## V.
The maximand will turn out to be zero in equilibrium.
A Walrasian auctioneer ﬁnds the set of equilibrium prices that
t p(v)
equates supply and demand for each history-contingent good. Demand
for a good is the sum of consumption and investment, and supply is
the endowment of the young plus the return on the previous period’s
investment. Thus the market-clearing conditions are
tt t t i(v)  c(v) p 1  i (v)R (v) tt t 1 t
for all periods and histories.
It is easy to derive one condition for equilibrium prices. The ﬁrm’s
objective function is linear in , its purchase of good v
t. For the ﬁrm
t i(v)
to buy a positive but ﬁnite amount of the good (which it will in equi-intergenerational risk sharing 529
librium), the derivative of proﬁts with respect to must be zero. This
t i(v)
requires that prices satisfy
tt t p(v) p (m  j )p(v, H)  (m  j )p(v, L). (3) t1 t1
The left side of this expression is the cost of buying a unit of good v
t
and the right is the ﬁrm’s revenue from buying the unit.
Beyond this point, ﬁnding the complete-markets equilibrium is a hard
problem, and we have been unable to ﬁnd a general analytical solution.
Therefore, we simplify the problem in two different ways in the next
two sections. In Section IV, we assume that capital returns are uncertain
in only a single period; thus there is only one shock. In Section V, we
consider a case with many shocks but solve the model using a ﬁrst-order
approximation. Thus we derive a solution that is valid when shocks to
capital returns are small. Each of these two special cases yields its own
insights into the nature of the complete-markets equilibrium.
IV. The Case of a Single Shock
The original position we have described includes many markets for
sharing risks. In this section, we consider a special case in which only
one generation faces uncertainty. In this example, the uncertainty con-
cerns the capital return in period j for the generation born at . In j  1
the notation introduced above, and for all . This ex- j 1 0 j p 0 t ( j jt
ample helps develop intuition about the model, and it is a building
block for the more general analysis below.
A. Solution for the Complete-Markets Equilibrium
In this example, the possible histories of the economy collapse to a
simple set. In period j, there are two possible states: the state in which
(H) and the state in which (L). In all other R p m  j R p m  j tt tt
periods, there is only a single state with . There is one possible R p m t
history of the economy through t for and two possible histories t ! j
through : the history with state H at j and the history with state L t ≥ j
at j. Figure 1 shows the possible histories in a graph. We index the
consumption goods in these histories by t for and by tH, tL for t ! j
. t ≥ j
The Appendix describes in detail the solution for the complete-
markets equilibrium. Here, we sketch the main steps in the analysis.
For periods before j, when the shock occurs, consumption in the
complete-markets equilibrium is the same as in the natural equilibrium.
Consumption before j cannot be made contingent on the shock. To
ﬁnd consumption for , we ﬁrst ﬁnd the prices of contingent goods t ≥ jF
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in those periods, which we denote by and . The Appendix shows PP tH tL
that these prices satisfy
P ti p m for i p H, L (4)
P (t1)i
and
2 P m  (m  1)jj tL p Q { . (5) 2 P m  (m  1)j tH j
These equations deﬁne all relative prices for goods dated j or later.
These equilibrium conditions are simple to interpret. Condition (4)
concerns the prices of the good in different periods but the same re-
alization of history. It is a special case of the no-arbitrage condition for
ﬁrms, equation (3). It says that the relative price of consumption at t
and must equal the return from investing at t. In this example, t  1
the return is ﬁxed at m for . t ≥ j
Condition (5) gives the relative price of consumption in the high-
and low-return histories, which is the same for all . The key result t ≥ j
is that , which follows from our assumptions that and Q 1 1 m 1 1 j 1 j
. This result means that it costs more than one unit of consumption 0
in the high-return history to buy a unit in the low-return history. This
feature of relative prices is necessary to induce agents to consume more
when more resources are available.
Given the equilibrium relative prices, the Appendix derives the
history-contingent consumption of each generation. For the generation
born at (the one that experiences the shock), consumption when j  1
old is given by
(1  Q)m  (1  Q)jj C p , jH 2
(1  Q)m  (1  Q)jj C p . (6) jL 2Q
For all generations born at j and later, consumption is
m(1  Q)
C p , tH 2
m(1  Q)
C p , t ≥ j  1. (7) tL 2Q
Equations (4)–(7) fully describe the complete-markets equilibrium.532 journal of political economy
B. Discussion of the Complete-Markets Equilibrium
The solution we have just described has two notable properties. First,
the ratio of consumption in the high- and low-return histories equals
for all generations born at and later. All these generations— Q 1 1 j  1
those who are old when the shock occurs and those who come later—
suffer the same proportional loss in consumption from a bad shock. In
other words, the risk from the shock is spread equally across generations.
This contrasts sharply with the natural equilibrium. In that equilib-
rium, the return risk in period j affects only the old in that period. The
ratio of consumption by the old in period j in the two histories is
, which is greater than Q. Thus this generation reduces (m  j)/(m  j) tt
its risk by moving from the natural equilibrium to the complete-markets
equilibrium, where it can share risk with future generations.
The second notable result concerns average consumption in the nat-
ural and complete-markets equilibria. For generations born at j and
later, average consumption over the high- and low-return histories is
. This exceeds m, which is these generations’ con-
2 m[(1  Q)] / [ 4 Q]
sumption in the natural equilibrium. Thus average consumption is
higher in the complete-markets equilibrium than in the natural equi-
librium for all these generations. A bit more algebra shows that for the
generation born at , average consumption is lower in the complete- j  1
markets equilibrium. Of course, for all generations, expected utility must
be higher in the complete-markets equilibrium, for the natural equilib-
rium is still budget feasible.
These results have a simple interpretation. In the natural equilibrium,
the generation born at is uniquely disadvantaged: it is the only j  1
generation facing return uncertainty. In the original position, it reduces
this uncertainty through the contingent-claims markets. In essence, it
buys insurance from later generations. But later generations are willing
to sell insurance only if they are compensated for taking on the risk.
This compensation is reﬂected in a value of Q greater than one. As a
result, later generations obtain more consumption in the high-return
history than they give up in the low-return history.
V. The Case of Many Shocks
Having explored the special case of a single shock, we now examine a
more general case in which there are shocks in many periods. For some
period T, we assume for all and for . The value j 1 0 t ≤ T j p 0 t 1 T tt
of T can be any positive integer, so our analysis covers any ﬁnite number
of shocks, however large. In the original position, there are now 2
t
markets for history-contingent consumption in each period and t ≤ T
2
T markets for . t 1 Tintergenerational risk sharing 533
In this case we cannot ﬁnd an exact solution for the complete-markets
equilibrium, but we can learn about it in two ways. First, we present
qualitative results about the equilibrium and how it differs from the
natural equilibrium. Second, we use a ﬁrst-order approximation to solve
for consumption in the complete-markets equilibrium. This approxi-
mation is valid when shocks to capital returns are small.
A. General Results
In our one-shock example, a key property of the complete-markets equi-
librium is that the effect of a shock is spread across all current and
future generations. This property carries over to the more general
model. The following proposition states this formally.
Proposition 1. Consider any periods and . Let v
t be any t ! Tt ≥ t
history through t in which , and let be the history that is the
 t v p H v t
same as v
t except that . Then .
t  t v p Lc (v) 1 c(v ) t tt
In other words, with the shocks in other periods held constant, a high
rather than low return in period t raises consumption at t and all later
periods. The risk from a shock in any period is spread into the fu-
ture.(Proposition 1 is proved in the Appendix.)
In the one-shock example, moving from the natural equilibrium to
the complete-markets equilibrium makes all generations better off. This
result also generalizes to the case of many shocks, as in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. For every generation, expected utility in the
complete-markets equilibrium is higher than expected utility in the nat-
ural equilibrium.
In other words, opening up the markets in the original position leads
to a Pareto improvement.
This proposition follows from proposition 1. That result implies that
each generation’s consumption in the complete-markets equilibrium
differs from its consumption in the natural equilibrium, in which a shock
affects only one generation. In the complete-markets case, it is feasible
for each generation to pick the natural allocation: it can eschew the
contingent-claims markets, save its endowment, and consume the return
on this saving. Since it chooses a different allocation, the one it chooses
must provide higher expected utility.
B. An Approximate Solution for Consumption
We would like to ﬁnd an explicit solution for consumption in the
complete-markets equilibrium. To simplify this problem, we use a ﬁrst-
order approximation that is valid as long as the shocks, jt, are small.534 journal of political economy
That is, we derive the complete-markets equilibrium when there are
small ﬂuctuations in capital returns.
To understand the approximation, let us write consumption in the
complete-markets equilibrium as . Consumption de-
t c(v; j ,… ,j ) t 1 T
pends on the history v
t, which tells whether capital returns are “high”
or “low” in each period through t. Consumption also depends on the
parameters , which determine the high and low returns. (In j ,… ,j 1 T
period t, the high return is and the low return is .) For a m  jm  j tt
given history v
t, we take a ﬁrst-order approximation of in ( c( 7) j ,… , 1
). We approximate around , the case of j (j ,… ,j ) p (0, …, 0) T 1 T
constant capital returns.
The advantage of using a ﬁrst-order approximation is that it eliminates
any possible interaction among the shocks in different periods. (This
is shown formally in the Appendix.) Thus we can use the results in the
previous section to show the effect of any individual shock, and we can
ﬁnd the effect of a series of shocks by summing the effects of the shocks.
Consider, then, a single shock in period . Equations (6) and (7) j ≤ T
give consumption for period j and after in terms of the relative price
Q. Substituting the expression for Q, equation (3), into (6) and (7)
yields consumption in terms of jj and m. Taking a ﬁrst-order approxi-
mation in jj around yields j p 0 j
m  1
C  m  j, tH j () m
m  1
C  m  j, t ≥ j. (8) tL j () m
(If you really want to see the details, go to the Appendix.)
According to equation (8), the shock to the capital return causes
consumption to rise or fall by a fraction of the shock for each (m  1)/m
generation born at and later. Note that there is no distinction here j  1
between the generation born at , who lives through the shock, and j  1
later generations. They share the risk equally and in an actuarially fair
way, so that all generations have the same average consumption. The
previous result that later generations have higher average consumption
no longer holds, because the relative price of consumption in the high-
and low-return histories approaches one as the shock becomes small.
That is, the compensation future generations demand to take on risk
is second-order, so it vanishes as the shock becomes small.
While equation (8) shows how consumption responds to a single small
shock, the result for a series of small shocks is found by summing the
effects of each shock. To express equilibrium in a particular history of
the economy, we let be an indicator variable equal to one if the Dt
history includes a high capital return in period t ( ) and minus v p H tintergenerational risk sharing 535
one if it includes a low return at t ( ). In any history, consumption v p L t
in period t is given by
t m  1
c  m  D j. (9)  tj j () m jp1
If all the shocks through period T are the same size ( for all j p j j ≤ j
), then this expression reduces to T
m  1 HL c  m  (N  N ) j, (10) tt t () m
where is the number of periods through t with high capital returns
H Nt
( ) and is the number with low returns ( ). A
L R p m  j NR p m  j t
generation’s consumption is raised by a ﬁxed amount for every high
return in the past and reduced by the same amount for every low return.
2
Note that the last equation implies
m  1
c  c  D j, t ≤ T.( 1 1 ) tt 1 t() m
In each period through T, the change in consumption is proportional
to the current shock. Thus, even though consumption in the natural
equilibrium was serially uncorrelated, consumption in the complete-
markets equilibrium follows a random walk. The reason is that full risk
sharing causes each shock to be spread equally over current and future
generations. Rather than a shock affecting only the generation living
through it, it affects later generations as well. Intergenerational risk
sharing makes the impact of a shock both smaller and more persistent.
C. Risk Sharing and Investment
Random-walk consumption is a familiar result. Hall (1978) ﬁnds that
optimal consumption for an inﬁnitely lived consumer is approximately
a random walk. Hall’s result also applies to a social planner choosing
consumption for different generations. Consumption is approximately
a random walk if the planner maximizes the discounted sum of all
generations’ expected utilities.
In our model, however, random-walk consumption is not the choice
of any social planner. Instead, it is the equilibrium outcome in markets
for risk sharing. The invisible hand of the market spreads risk across
2 Another way to write our result is
m  1
c p m  D j  o(kj ,… ,j k).  tj j 1 T () m
That is, consumption equals the expression in eq. (9) plus terms that are second-order
or higher in the sizes of the shocks.536 journal of political economy
generations, making consumption a random walk. No policy maker
needs to intervene—as long as agents can trade in an original position
before the beginning of time.
It is instructive to look behind the contingent-claims markets to see
the mechanics of how risk sharing occurs. In a static setting, risk sharing
means that consumption is shifted from one agent to another at a point
in time. Here, risk sharing occurs between agents alive in different
periods and therefore requires shifts in the paths of aggregate consump-
tion and investment.
Suppose, for example, that there is a low realization of the capital
return in period j. The old at j receive a transfer that partially offsets
this shock. This transfer must come from the endowment of the young,
so less is left for investment. Lower investment means fewer resources
for the young when they become old at , so they, too, receive a j  1
transfer from the next generation. In this way, a low realization of the
capital return reduces investment throughout the future. A high real-
ization does the reverse. In the natural equilibrium, by contrast, in-
vestment is ﬁxed at one, the endowment of the young.
VI. Implications for the Design of Social Security
So far, we have considered how optimal intergenerational risk sharing,
as modeled by complete contingent-claims markets, affects the alloca-
tion of resources. We now move closer to issues of policy and consider
what institutions might support this optimal allocation. The natural
institution to consider is social security, because it takes resources from
some generations and gives resources to others, which is what is needed
to share generational risk. But how should we design a social security
system if our goal is to implement the allocation of resources in the
complete-markets equilibrium?
The ﬁrst result concerning social security design follows naturally
from the results we have already seen.
Proposition 3. Without government intervention, the economy
cannot reach the optimal allocation of risk across generations.
This proposition follows from the fact that, in the absence of gov-
ernment intervention, the economy reaches the natural equilibrium.
We have seen that this allocation is Pareto inferior to the complete-
markets equilibrium. Similar results about the suboptimality of the equi-
librium without intervention are presented by authors such as Bohn
(1998) and Rangel and Zeckhauser (2001).
Proposition 3 is relevant for evaluating one proposal for social security
reform, a system that mandates savings through individual retirement
accounts. In our model, such a system does not move the allocation of
risk away from the natural equilibrium: each generation still bears theintergenerational risk sharing 537
TABLE 1
A Social Security System Invested in Equity
Transactions of the generation born in period t:
When the generation is young (period t):
• It pays a tax of one (its entire endowment)
When the generation is old (period ): t  1
• It receives a social security beneﬁt of
t1
CM c  m  D[(m  1)/m]j t1 jj
jp1
full risk of shocks to the capital return rather than sharing the risk with
other generations. Therefore, a social security system based entirely on
individual accounts is inefﬁcient.
Although it is easy to see that a privatized social security system does
not implement the complete-markets equilibrium, it is less obvious how
to describe policies that do. In overlapping-generations models, the
government can often achieve the same allocation of resources in several
equivalent ways. For example, a tax or transfer can occur when a person
is young or old; with appropriate discounting, this does not matter for
the resulting allocation of consumption. For concreteness and realism,
we focus on policies that resemble social security systems: the young pay
taxes, and the old receive transfers. We examine two ways to implement
the complete-markets equilibrium. The ﬁrst is described in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. The government can implement the complete-
markets equilibrium using a fully funded social security system with a
trust fund invested in equity claims to capital. The social security beneﬁt
responds positively to the capital return, and it approximately follows
a random walk.
The proof is straightforward. In essence, the government here cen-
trally plans the economy. It holds all assets and enforces the complete-
markets allocation of consumption.
Table 1 describes how the government treats the generation born in
period t. It taxes 100 percent of the generation’s endowment, which is
one unit of the consumption good (recall that there is no ﬁrst-period
consumption). When the generation is old, at , it receives a social t  1
security beneﬁt equal to its consumption in the complete-markets equi-
librium ( ). This rule for beneﬁts ensures that the system replicates
CM ct1
the equilibrium. Proposition 1 tells us that the beneﬁt responds posi-
tively to the capital return. The beneﬁt is approximated by equation
(9), which is a random walk.
In this system, the government invests its tax revenue in capital. In
each period, its investment equals , the level of investment in the
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TABLE 2
A Social Security System Invested in Safe Debt
Transactions of the generation born in period t:
When the generation is young (period t):
• It pays a tax of one (its entire endowment)
• It sells a quantity of safe debt to the government
CM it
• It buys a quantity of capital
CM it
When the generation is old (period ): t  1
• It pays to retire its debt
CM iR * tt 1
• It earns from its capital
CM iR tt 1
• It receives a social security beneﬁt of
t1
CM CM c  i (R  R*)  m  D[(m  1)/m]j  D j t1 tt 1 t1 jj t 1 t1
jp1
t
 m  D[(m  1)/m]j  (1/m)D j . jj t 1 t1
jp1
complete-markets equilibrium. The paths of consumption and invest-
ment are feasible because the complete-markets equilibrium is feasible.
This social security system may seem remote from real-world policy,
but there is another, more plausible, way to describe it. Under this
system, the tax rate is constant, the system is fully funded and invested
in equity, and the beneﬁt rises or falls as the economy realizes shocks.
In each period, the beneﬁt as described by equation (9) is based on
the system’s “permanent income.” That is, the beneﬁt is set at a level
that could remain constant without further shocks. Seen in this light,
the system resembles some proposals for social security reform, which
often involve both government ownership of equity and adjustment of
beneﬁts to changes in the system’s expected resources.
In the system just described, the social security trust fund must be
invested in equity claims to capital. There is, however, another way to
reach the complete-markets allocation that does not require the trust
fund to hold equity claims.
Proposition 5. The government can implement the complete-
markets equilibrium using a fully funded social security system invested
in riskless bonds. In this system, the beneﬁts received by the old are
negatively indexed to the current return to capital.
To establish this proposition, we construct a social security system with
the properties it states. This system is summarized in table 2. As in the
previous system, the government taxes 100 percent of the young’s en-
dowment. It also buys safe debt from the young. In period t, the gov-
ernment purchases a quantity of debt with a gross interest rate of
CM it
, the equilibrium rate for safe debt maturing at . The young R* t  1 t1
use the proceeds from selling debt to buy a quantity of capital.
CM it
When a generation is old, it receives the return on its capital,
. It also pays to the government to retire its debt. Finally,
CM CM iR iR * tt 1 tt 1intergenerational risk sharing 539
the old receive a social security beneﬁt that equals consumption in the
complete-markets equilibrium, , minus a term . This
CM CM ci (R  R*) t1 tt 1 t1
term offsets the generation’s net gain from being long in capital and
short in debt. In effect, the government insures the private sector against
the uncertainty it has taken on by holding equity. With this adjustment,
the social security beneﬁt and the old’s net asset income add up to
, implying that the system replicates the complete-markets
CM ct1
equilibrium.
Table 2 gives an approximate solution for the social security beneﬁt.
The term is the difference between the return on equity, R  R* t1 t1
, and the return on safe debt. One can show that, under the m  D j t1 t1
assumption of small shocks, the return on debt equals m, the average
return on equity. (As we have seen, the compensation required to take
on risk is second-order.) Therefore, is approximately R  R* t1 t1
, which implies that is approximately .
CM D j i (R  R*) D j t1 t1 tt 1 t1 t1 t1
This amount is subtracted from the expression for to give the social
CM ct1
security beneﬁt.
3
In the solution for the social security beneﬁt, the coefﬁcient on the
current shock to the capital return, , is D j [(m  1)/m]  1 p t1 t1
. Thus, as stated in proposition 5, the beneﬁt is negatively in- 1/m ! 0
dexed to the current capital return. This indexation is how the govern-
ment insures the private sector against capital-return risk.
4
The message of propositions 4 and 5 can be summarized as follows.
In the natural equilibrium, capital risk in any period falls entirely on
the generation that is old in that period. To move toward the complete-
markets equilibrium, a social security system has to share that risk with
future generations. There are two ways to do this. The social security
system can hold the economy’s capital stock and the risks associated
with it. Or the social security system can insure generations for the
capital risk they bear through negative indexation.
3 Note that ; i.e., shocks to capital returns cause ﬁrst-order
CM i p 1  O(kj ,… ,j k) t 1 T
changes in investment. However,
CM i (R  R*)p [1  O(kj ,… ,j k)][D j  o(kj ,… ,j k)] tt 1 t11 Tt 1 t11T
p D j  o(kj ,… ,j k), t1 t11T
justifying the approximation in table 2.
4 We have examined the case of small shocks, but the negative-indexation result is
general: without any approximation, one can show that the social security beneﬁtresponds
negatively to the current capital return. This result follows from proposition 1, whichstates
that a higher capital return raises consumption in all future periods. To make it feasible
to raise future consumption, the government must increase its current level of assets.
When the private sector owns the capital stock, the capital return does not directly affect
the government’s resources;thusan increase inthegovernment’sassetsrequiresadecrease
in the current social security beneﬁt.540 journal of political economy
VII. Extensions
Here we discuss some variations on our model that provide additional
insight into the nature of the complete-markets equilibrium and optimal
policy.
A. Two Generalizations
Two generalizations of our model are straightforward. We summarize
them here and provide details in our working paper (Ball and Mankiw
2001).
In the ﬁrst generalization, agents’ initial endowments as well as capital
returns are uncertain. This assumption captures uncertainty about work-
ers’ wages when young. We assume that the endowment follows a ran-
dom walk with drift. In the natural equilibrium, a shock to the endow-
ment affects the consumption of the current young and all future
generations, because the shock is permanent, but not the consumption
of the current old. In the complete-markets equilibrium, the old share
the risk from endowment shocks. The optimal social security system is
the same as before, except that shocks to endowments as well as capital
returns cause changes in the level of beneﬁts.
The other generalization modiﬁes the utility function so that individ-
uals consume in both periods of life. In this case, the complete-markets
equilibrium produces perfect risk sharing across agents consuming in
the same period: the ratio of consumption by the old and the young is
a constant. For the case of small shocks, aggregate consumption follows
a random walk, with the consumption of young and old responding
together to endowment and capital-return shocks. Once again, the op-
timal social security system is not greatly affected by the generalization.
The only new feature is that the tax rate on endowments is less than
one, so the young can consume. Both this tax rate and the level of social
security beneﬁts follow random walks.
B. A Model without Investment
Risk sharing in our baseline model involves reallocations of consump-
tion over time, which are accomplished through shifts in investment.
One might wonder whether such reallocations are essential for the
model’s contingent-claims markets to raise welfare. To explore this issue,
we consider a variation on the model in which it is not technologically
feasible to shift aggregate consumption. We ﬁnd that some but not all
of our results are robust. (We only sketch our derivations since they
parallel our analysis of the main model.)
Speciﬁcally, we consider a model (suggested by the editor) in whichintergenerational risk sharing 541
there is no investment. As in our main model, agents have an endow-
ment of one when young. They consume in both periods of life; the
period utility function is given by equation (1), and agents maximize a
weighted sum of utility in the two periods. All of a period’s endowment
must be consumed by someone in that period, which implies no in-
vestment. However, there is a type of capital: an inﬁnitely lived tree that
produces a random amount of the consumption good in each period
(as in Lucas [1978]). The tree’s output in period t, , equals and R m  j t
with equal probability. The tree is endowed to the ﬁrst old m  j
generation.
In the natural equilibrium of this model, the old receive the output
of the tree and then, having no further use for it, sell it to the young.
Thus the ownership of the tree is passed down to each generation. One
can show that the equilibrium price of the tree is a constant q that lies
between zero and one. In period t, consumption of the young and old
are given by
y c p 1  q, t
o c p R  q. tt
The young consume the remainder of their endowment after buying
the tree, and the old consume the tree’s output plus the revenue from
selling it.
Note that the consumption of the young is constant and the con-
sumption of the old depends on the capital return. In the natural equi-
librium, the young cannot take on any return risk because they enter
the market after the current return is realized.
In the complete-markets equilibrium, agents can in principle trade
the same history-contingent consumption goods as in our main model.
However, since it is not feasible to move consumption across periods,
in equilibrium no risk is spread over time. Risk sharing occurs only
between the old and young within a period. In effect, the only relevant
markets are those for consumption in a period conditional on the state
in that period, not the whole history. For the case of small shocks,
equilibrium consumption of the old and young are given by
j(1  q) y c  1  q  D , tt [] m  1
j(mq) o c  m  q  D . tt [] m  1
This solution is the same as the natural equilibrium except that con-
sumption equal to is shifted from the old to the young j(1  q)/(m  1)542 journal of political economy
when the capital return is high and vice versa when it is low. The ratio
of consumption in the two states is the same for the two generations,
as required for optimal risk sharing.
While complete-markets risk sharing is more limited here than in our
main model, the broad policy implications are similar. One can show
that the main ideas of propositions 3–5 still hold: the natural equilibrium
is suboptimal; the complete-markets equilibrium can be implemented
by a fully funded social security system that holds capital (in this case
the tree, which is expropriated from the ﬁrst generation); and the social
security system can also hold safe debt, allow private agents to hold the
tree, and adjust beneﬁts to offset shocks to the tree’s output.
Some details of optimal social security are different from before. For
example, in our main model, the level of beneﬁts is approximately a
random walk when the trust fund holds equity. Taxes also follow a ran-
dom walk if agents consume in both periods of life. Here, beneﬁts and
taxes are serially uncorrelated. A high capital return implies higher
beneﬁts and lower taxes in the current period but does not affect the
future. This result reﬂects the impossibility of smoothing consumption
over time when there is no investment.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper has explored an approach to analyzing intergenerational
risk sharing. According to this approach, policy makers designing in-
stitutions that share generational risk should attempt to achieve the
allocation that the various generations would reach on their own if they
could have traded in complete contingent-claims markets. That is, policy
should achieve what the invisible hand would if it could.
This approach can be used not only for deriving the optimal allocation
of consumption but also as a guide for the design of a social security
system. An obvious but important result from our analysis is the subop-
timality of private retirement accounts—a possible social security reform
that has received much attention in recent years. Private retirement
accounts merely replicate the equilibrium without any intergenerational
risk sharing. That is, private retirement accounts leave all generations
facing more risk than they should.
Another robust conclusion from our analysis is that the government
should spread capital risk among generations in a way that appears
absent from current policy. If equity claims to capital are held privately,
as they are now, then optimal intergenerational risk sharing requires
that social security beneﬁts be negatively indexed to the capital return:
social security beneﬁts should be cut when the stock market is doing
well. In the absence of such negative indexation, the government should
invest the social security trust fund directly in capital. Negative index-intergenerational risk sharing 543
ation and government ownership of capital seem to be the only mech-
anisms that allow current capital risk to be shared optimally with future
generations.
Several recent proposals for social security reform have, in fact, in-
cluded such provisions. The Clinton administration, for instance, pro-
posed investing the social security trust fund in equities, as envisioned
in our proposition 4. The negative indexation of beneﬁts to equity
returns may seem less likely, but in fact it is part of the Feldstein proposal
for social security reform (see, e.g., Feldstein and Samwick 1999; Feld-
stein and Ranguelova 2001). In this plan, individuals would have private
accounts invested in capital markets; the more they earn in these ac-
counts, however, the less they would receive in supplemental beneﬁts.
This “clawback” provision, as it is often called, resembles the negative
indexation envisioned in our proposition 5. Either approach could im-
plement the complete-markets equilibrium, raising the expected welfare
of all generations. In theory, intergenerational risk sharing offers the
prospect of a free lunch.
Admittedly, given economists’ limited understanding of these issues,
it may be too early to jump to policy conclusions. The model in this
paper makes many strong assumptions: individuals within a generation
are homogeneous, capital returns are exogenous, all generations are
the same size, and so on. Addressing real-world issues of social security
reform will require relaxing these assumptions. Fortunately, the concept
of a complete-markets equilibrium—the equilibrium in an overlapping-
generations model with complete Arrow-Debreu contingent-claims mar-
kets in a Rawlsian original position—is quite general. Future work could
investigate the nature of the complete-markets equilibrium and the in-
stitutions that can implement it in a richer variety of settings.
Appendix
This appendix presents details of our analysis that are omitted from the text.
Equilibrium Prices with a Single Capital-Return Shock
Here we derive the complete-markets equilibrium when there is a single capital-
return shock in period j. We do this by deriving two necessary conditions for
the equilibrium, equations (4) and (5).
To derive equation (4), we start with the no-arbitrage condition for ﬁrms,
equation (3). This condition says that the price of a good at t equals the revenue
from using the good to produce goods at . In the one-shock case, the price t1
of a good at is for , L. The revenue from the good is , since t ≥ jP i p H mP ti (t1)i
each unit of good ti produces m units of good . (In contrast to the many- (t1)i
shock case, only a single good at is produced, because the two states at t1
collapse to one.) Setting yields equation (4). t1 P p mP ti (t1)i
Now consider equation (5), which gives the relative price of consumption in544 journal of political economy
histories H and L. This equation follows from two underlying conditions. The
ﬁrst is a ﬁrst-order condition for utility maximization: the relative price Q must
equal the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption in the two histories. With
utility function (1), the marginal utility is . Thus for . 1/cQ p c / ct ≥ h tH tL
The other condition underlying(5) isthat,ineachpossiblehistory,thepresent
value of total consumption beginning in period j must equal the present value
of resources beginning at j, given the gross interest rate m that holds from j
on. The present value of resources is the gross return on capital at j plus the 1
present value of endowments at j, , …. If the present value of consumption j1
were greater than the present value of resources, the allocation would not be
feasible. If the reverse were true, the allocation would be inefﬁcient and hence
could not be a Walrasian equilibrium.
In the high-return history, the gross capital return in period j is and mjj
the endowments at j and subsequent periods are all one. The present value of
these resources is . In the low-return history, the endowments mj [m/(m1)] j
are the same but the capital return at j is ; the present value of resources mjj
is . mj [m/(m1)] j
Since the present value of resources must equal the present value of con-
sumption in each history, the ratio of the present values of resources in the two
histories must equal the ratio of the present values of consumption. We know
that the ratio of consumption in the two histories, , is Q in every period c / c tH tL
. Therefore, the ratio of present values of consumption is Q. Setting Q equal t ≥ j
to the ratio of present values of resources yields
mj [m/(m1)] j Q p ,
mj [m/(m1)] j
which implies equation (5).
Equilibrium Consumption Levels with a Single Capital-Return Shock
Given the relative prices in equations (4) and (5), one can derive equilibrium
consumption levels from agents’ utility maximization problems. An agent born
in period has an endowment of one unit of good tH and one unit of good t ≥ j
tL. If we treat good tH as the numeraire, the value of this endowment is 1
. The agent wants to consume goods and . Given (4) and (5), Q (t1)H (t1)L
his budget constraint is
c Qc p m(1 Q). (A1) (t1)H (t1)L
Maximizing expected utility, equation (1), over the two histories subject to (A1)
yields the solutions for and in equation (7). cc (t1)H (t1)L
The generation born at receives a unit of good : this is not indexed j1 j1
by H or L because the shock has not yet occurred. From condition (3), the
value of this endowment is the same as the value of units of good jH and mjj
units of good jL. An agent born at purchases goods jH and jL subject mj j1 j
to the budget constraint
c Qc p mj Q(mj). (A2) jH jL j j
Maximizing expected utility subject to (A2) leads to the consumption levels in
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A Planner’s Problem
As discussed in the text,the complete-marketsequilibriumisefﬁcient.Therefore,
this allocation is the solution to a social planning problem for some setofweights
on the utility of different generations. This fact will help us prove propositions
1 and 2.
Formally, the planning problem is
1 tt max b(t) u(c(v))( ) (A3)  t 2 [] t tt … t≥1 v V## V {c (v ),i (v )} tt
subject to the resource constraint
tt t i(v)c(v) p 1i (v)R , tt t 1 t
given . The constant b(t) is the weight the planner puts on the generation i p 1 0
that consumes at t. Note that is the probability of each of the 2
t possible
1 t () 2
histories through t.
The planner’s problem produces a familiar ﬁrst-order condition:
b(t1) 1   t   t   t u(c(v)) p [u(c (v, H))(mj )u(c (v, L))(mj )]. (A 4) tt 1 t1 t1 t1 [] b(t)2
For any history v
t, the left side of this condition is the marginal utility of con-
sumption at t. The right side is a ratio of planner weights times the expected
value of , given the two possible continuations of history v
t.
  u(c )R t1 t1
Proof of Proposition 1
To prove proposition 1, we use the fact that the complete-markets equilibrium
solves the planner’s problem in (A3). We show that the planner chooses higher
consumption at t if there is a high rather than low capital return at . t ≤ t
For this argument, we simplify the planner’s problem by noting that there is
only one state variable. This variable is the gross return on the previous period’s
investment, , which we will denote . The planner begins each period with iR x t1 tt
resources , so the history v
t affects his opportunities only through . There- x 1 x t t
fore, we can write the planner’s optimal behavior as a function of rather than xt
the whole history: and . c(x ) i(x ) tt tt
Given this setup, there are two steps in proving proposition 1. First, we show
that for all t. Second, we show that this fact is sufﬁcient to prove
  0 ! c (x ) ! 1 tt
the proposition.
We will only sketch the ﬁrst step since the formal details are tedious. The
condition that is equivalent to , since .
   0 ! c (x ) ! 10 ! i(x ) ! 1 i p x 1c tt t t t t t
The condition says that an extra unit of resources brought into a period goes
partlyto consumptionandpartlytoinvestment,whichraisesfutureconsumption.
This is standard consumption smoothing. A windfall must be split between the
present and future to maintain the optimal ratios of expected marginal utilities
(eq. [A4]).
Proposition 1 states that is higher in history v
t than in , which differs only
 t c v t
by having a lower capital return at . Since , it sufﬁces to prove that
  t ≤ tc (x ) 1 0 tt
is higher in history v
t: . This follows by induction if (i)
t  tt xx (v) 1 x(v ) x (v) 1 tt t t
and (ii) implies for . Fact i is true
 tt  tt  t x (v ) x (v) 1 x (v ) x (v) 1 x (v ) t ≤ s ! t t ss s 1 s1
because and , since the twohistoriesareidentical
t  tt  t R (v) 1 R (v ) i (v) p i (v ) tt t 1 t1546 journal of political economy
through . To establish fact ii, note that implies
t  tt  t t1 x (v) 1 x (v ) i(v) 1 i(v ) ss s s
because . By assumption, , so .
  t  tt  t i(x ) 1 0 R (v) p R (v ) x (v) 1 x (v ) ss s 1 s1 s1 s1
The Case of Many Small Shocks
Equation (8) gives a ﬁrst-order approximation in jj of equations (6) and (7),
the equilibrium consumption levels in the example of a single capital-return
shock. To see how (8) is derived, consider for . Evaluating the ex- ct ≥ j1 tH
pression in (7) at yields since when . Differentiating j p 0 c p m Q p 1 j p 0 jt H j
with respect to jj yields ctH
dc dc dQ tH tH p () () ( ) FF F [] [ ] dj dQ dj j p0 Qp1 j p0 jj jj
m 2(m1)
p() 2 [] 2 m
m1
p ,( A 5 )
m
where the second line uses (7) and (5). This result leads to the approximate
solution for in (8). The results for and for consumption at are cc t p j tH tL
obtained similarly.
Our use of ﬁrst-order approximations makes it easy to go from one shock to
the case of for all . We will focus on deriving consumption in periods j 1 0 t ≤ T t
(the analysis for is similar). We are interested in ﬁnding
t t ≤ Tt 1 Tc (v; j , t 1
, that is, consumption in period t and history v
t as a function of the sizes …,j ) T
of shocks. A ﬁrst-order approximation in yields j ,… ,j 1 T
T ct c  c(0, …, 0) (0, …, 0)j,( A 6 )  tt s j sp1 s
where we suppress the v
t.
In this expression, the ﬁrst term on the right ism,theequilibriumconsumption
level when there are no shocks. Within the sum, a term can be c/j(0, …, 0) ts
determined as follows. Consider , that is, as a function c(0, …, 0, j,0 ,…,0 ) c ts t
of js when all other j’s are zero. This function is the solution for conditional
consumption in period t when there is a single capital-return shock at s. Dif-
ferentiating this solution with respect to js and evaluating it at yields j p 0 s
. c/j(0, …, 0) ts
For , is given by equations (6) and (7). We have s ≤ tc (0, …, 0, j,0 ,… ,0 ) ts
seen that the derivatives of (6) and (7) evaluated at are when j p 0( m1)/m s
the capital return at s is high and when the return is low. These (m1)/m
results imply for . For , c/j(0, …, 0) p D(m1)/m s ≤ ts 1 tc (0, …, 0, j,0 , ts s t s
and . Substituting these results into (A6) yields …,0)p m c/j(0, …, 0) p 0 ts
equation (9), the approximate solution for consumption in the case of many
shocks.intergenerational risk sharing 547
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